The Portfolio salience in Paraguay: a qualitative evaluation of Mario Abdo Benítez´s cabinet
Keywords:
Portfolio salience, ministerial capacities, cabinetsAbstract
What are the most important ministries for the Paraguayan government of Mario Abdo Benítez? This article makes an evaluation of the cabinet based on the theoretical proposal of Camerlo and Martínez Gallardo (2017) by analyzing four key dimensions based on a qualitative methodology that combines the study of current regulations, the general state budgets, a hemerographic review and the judgment of experts. The main findings reveal that there are currently four types of ministries in Paraguay, according to the importance given to them: a) those with high priority; b) those that are considered important, but with more heterogeneous capacities; c) those who, in general terms, possess medium capacities; and d) those that are not of any importance for the current administration. Likewise, it is possible to ensure that it is a party cabinet with conservative orientations regarding its public policies. This paper seeks to identify: 1) which are the most important ministries for President Mario Abdo Benitez? 2) what are the attributes that determine that a ministry is considered important in the presidential administration in Paraguay (2018-2023)?
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